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CUTTING THE WIRE: A
COMPREHENSIVE EU-WIDE
APPROACH TO REFUGEE CRISES
“A nation ringed by walls would only imprison itself.”1
INTRODUCTION
n September 3, 2015, the image of a lifeless young boy,
who drowned while crossing the Mediterranean Sea with
his family to escape war-torn Syria, flooded international media
outlets and exposed one of the horrors refugees face when seek-
ing sanctuary.2 Unfortunately, death is commonplace for mi-
grants traversing the Mediterranean Sea in order to escape their
countries of origin.3 The International Organization for Migra-
tion4 estimates that over 3,500 migrants have drowned in the
Mediterranean since the beginning of 2016.5 Moreover, even
when a refugee arrives on European shores, there is no guaran-
tee that he or she will be welcomed or permitted to stay. This
1. A quote from U.S. President Barack Obama at his last appearance with
the U.N. General Assembly, where he pressed for more integrated and cooper-
ative global efforts to address transnational issues such as the refugee crisis.
Mark Lander, Obama, in Farewell to U.N., Paints Stark Choices for World,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2016, at A10.
2. Joe Parkinson, Image of a Drowned Syrian Boy Echoes Around World,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2015, 7:28 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/image-of-syrian-boy-washed-up-on-beach-hits-
hard-1441282847.
3. News media has documented the frequency of overcrowded capsized
rafts and European coastguard rescues on the Mediterranean Sea. More re-
cently, the bodies of at least one hundred migrants, “including many women
and children” believed to be from mostly African countries, washed ashore on
a Libyan beach in June 2016. Josephine McKenna & Louisa Loveluck, Refugee
Crisis: 117 Migrants Found Dead on Libyan Beach as Mediterranean Drown-
ings Rise Alarmingly, TELEGRAPH (June 3, 2016), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/2016/06/03/refugee-crisis-300-people-rescued-as-boat-cap-
sizes-off-island-of/.
4. The International Organization for Migration is “the leading inter-gov-
ernmental organization in the field of migration” and works with national gov-
ernments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to “en-
sure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote interna-
tional cooperation on migration issues,” among other things. About IOM, INT’L
ORG. FORMIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/about-iom (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
5. Int’l Org. for Migration, Mediterranean Sea, MISSING MIGRANTS
PROJECT, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean (last visited Sept. 23,
2016).
O
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uncertainty is exacerbated in times of mass migration crises,
like the one currently engulfing Europe, which has received over
a million refugees since 2015, because states do not have the ca-
pacity to process each individual asylum application due to the
number they receive.6
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) deter-
mined that the traditional response by states to large influxes of
refugees “has been to use prima facie [group] determination[s]”
without formally evaluating each individual’s refugee status
claim.7 In essence, prima facie group determinations are a
state’s recognition of refugee status “on the basis of readily ap-
parent, objective circumstances” in the refugee’s country of
origin prompting the exodus.8 The European Union has not
adopted this approach to the current refugee crisis. Instead, EU
Member States are at a standstill and divided9 over how to ad-
dress the mass influx of migrants while remaining within the
bounds of both EU asylum laws and European human rights
laws, as well as international refugee law.
The disjointed treatment of refugees among EU Member
States demonstrates the dissidence in which Member States
view their legal obligations. For instance, in 2015, Germany
planned to take in at least eight hundred thousand migrants10
and contribute significant funds to deal with the refugee crisis.11
6. Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015:
IOM, INT’LORG. FORMIGRATION (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.iom.int/news/irreg-
ular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom [hereinafter
Irregular Migrant Arrivals].
7. Global Consultations on International Protection, Protection of Refugees
in Mass Influx Situations: Overall Protection Framework, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/4 (Feb. 19, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/558a62299.html.
8. Id. ¶ 6.
9. Rick Lyman & Alison Smale, As Europe Grasps for Answers, More Mi-
grants Flood Its Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2015, at A1.
10. Luke Harding et al., Germany Urges Other EU Countries to Take In
More Refugees, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2015/aug/31/refugees-found-suffocated-lorry-austria-syrian-
family-of-six. In fact, Germany accepted almost nine hundred thousand refu-
gees in 2015. Rick Noack, Germany Said it Took in More than 1 Million Refu-
gees Last Year. But it Didn’t., WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/30/germany-said-it-took-in-
more-than-1-million-refugees-last-year-but-it-didnt/.
11. In 2015, Germany planned to contribute about $6.7 billion USD. Rick
Lyman et al., A Steady Flow Staggers Into Europe, Outpacing Pledges of Shel-
ter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, at A9. Additionally, in May 2016, the German
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Conversely, Hungary has not been nearly as receptive with re-
spect to taking in refugees within its borders. In fact, the Hun-
garian Parliament has pursued measures to close its borders,
including “building a razor-wire fence along its 108-mile south-
ern border with Serbia” and adopting both harsher laws involv-
ing the treatment of migrants and imposing penalties on indi-
viduals who help them.12 The difference in EU Member States’
responses to the refugee crisis is surprising given that all EU
Member States are parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (the “1951 Convention”)13 and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “1967 Proto-
col”).14
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the 1951 Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol were the international community’s
response to the exodus of individuals who fled Nazi persecution
during World War II.15 The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Pro-
tocol lie at the heart of the international regime of refugee pro-
tection. In fact, they are the only global treaties of refugee law.16
Furthermore, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are in-
tegral to refugee protection, as they elucidate the minimum ob-
ligations that states parties must provide to refugees and iden-
tify refugees’ legal rights.17 For example, in defining “refugee,”
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as enhanced by the 1967 Pro-
Federal Ministry of Finance projected to spend at least $100 billion USD by
the end of 2020 on costs associated with the refugee crisis.German Government
Plans to Spend 93.6 Billion Euros on Refugees by End 2020: Spiegel, REUTERS
(May 14, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-
costs-idUSKCN0Y50DY.
12. Lyman & Smale, supra note 9.
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; see also States Parties to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/pro-
tect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last updated Apr. 17, 2015) [hereinafter
States Parties].
14. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; States Parties, supra note 13.
15. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Introductory Note, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L
L., http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/prsr/prsr_e.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
16. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 2 (2011), http://www.un-
hcr.org/4ec262df9.pdf.
17. See id.
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tocol’s removal of the temporal and geographical restrictions im-
posed on refugee status,18 establishes bright-line qualifications
that a refugee must possess before receiving refugee status in-
ternationally: mainly, a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of one of the five protected grounds (race, religion, mem-
bership in a particular social group, nationality, or political opin-
ion).19 The 1951 Convention is also significant because it “con-
tains a range of rights to which refugees are entitled,”20 most
importantly the prohibition on refoulement.21Article 33 contains
the nonrefoulement clause, which today is a customary norm of
international law that prohibits all states, including non-state
parties to the 1951 Convention, from returning a refugee to their
country of origin, where the refugee’s life or freedom would be
threatened on account of one of the five protected grounds.22
Although the provisions of the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol are legally binding throughout the EU, it is evident that
some EU Member States are ignoring their obligations in the
wake of the recent migrant crisis.23 As migrants arrive by the
thousands on European shores, some EUMember States are nei-
ther acting in accordance with the spirit of international refugee
law nor complying with either the EU’s regional asylum laws,
which incorporate the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, or
European human rights law.24 Moreover, it is clear that one of
the EU’s main goals of promoting human rights regionally and
internationally25 has taken a backseat, as demonstrated by the
harsh treatment of refugees at Member States’ borders and in
18. The 1967 Protocol expanded the scope of protection under the 1951 Con-
vention by removing the temporal and geographical limitations imposed by the
1951 Convention’s original definition, which only applied to events occurring
in Europe as a result of World War II. 1967 Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1.
19. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1. This can also be viewed as a
workable standard, as states parties are free to expand the scope of who qual-
ifies for refugee protection (i.e., an individual fleeing an environmental disas-
ter), as long as it falls within the limits of Article 1. Id. art. 5.
20. Alice Edwards, International Refugee Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 521 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014).
21. See 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 33.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Parts I, II.
25. The EU in Brief, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-infor-
mation/about/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2015) [hereinafter EU in
Brief].
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refugee camps.26 Thus, in a hasty reaction to both the deluge of
refugees and conflicting responses to the crisis by Member
States, the EU, through acts of the EU’s executive body (Euro-
pean Commission)27 and EU’s legislative body (the Council of the
EU (the “Council”)),28 attempted to force uniformity throughout
the Member States by implementing an “agreed” upon 29 tempo-
rary relocation mechanism: the quota system.
Based on a proposal from the European Commission, on Sep-
tember 14, 2015, the Council implemented the initial quota sys-
tem, which was to relocate forty thousand persons in clear need
of international protection from Italy and Greece30 and disperse
them throughout other EU Member States.31 The Council, how-
ever, realized that Greece and Italy’s asylum systems would con-
tinue to face heightened pressure and, as a result, approved a
new plan that added an additional 120,000 persons to the origi-
nal number of persons to be relocated, thereby totaling 160,000
26. See supra Part III.B.
27. The European Commission is the EU’s executive body. About the Euro-
pean Commission, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/about/index_en.htm
(last visited Oct. 6, 2016). Among many other executory functions, it has the
ability to propose legislation and enforce European law. Id.
28. The Council of the EU consists of “Government ministers from each EU
country.” Council of the European Union, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
The Council “negotiates and adopts EU laws, . . . coordinates member states’
policies, . . . develops the EU’s common foreign and security policy, . . . con-
cludes international agreements, and . . . adopts the EU budget.” Id. Further-
more, the Council ministers have the authority to commit their governments
to the actions agreed on in Council meetings. Id. For more information about
the Council, see Council of the European Union, COUNCIL EUR. UNION,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/ (last updated Jan. 28, 2015).
29. On the contrary, some Member States did not voluntarily agree to im-
plement the quota system and take in refugees. The quota scheme, however,
was approved, despite protests from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania,
and Hungary. Matthew Holehouse, EU Quota Plan Forced Through Against
Eastern European States’ Wishes, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11883024/Europe-ministers-agree-relo-
cation-of-120000-refugees-by-large-majority.html.
30. The Council of the EU recognized that Italy and Greece “have experi-
enced unprecedented flows of migrants” as these countries continue to be
hotspots for irregular border crossings because they lie along the Mediterra-
nean Sea. Council Decision 2015/1523, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 147 (EU) [hereinafter
Council Decision 2015/1523].
31. Id. at 146.
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persons.32 In implementing the quota system, the Council tried
to ensure that Member States were acting in solidarity and
fairly sharing the responsibility in regards to examining and
processing applications for international protection.33 Despite
the EU’s efforts, however, some countries have resisted opening
their borders.34 The discordance among Member States’ re-
sponses demonstrates that piecemeal, reactionary solutions are
ineffective for these types of crises, and more meaningful, proac-
tive, and uniform actions are needed to both alleviate the cur-
rent crisis and address future migrant exoduses.
Rather than continuing to adhere to obsolete and ineffective
legislation, the EU should instead implement a regulation35 that
establishes a two-step permanent emergency framework for re-
sponding to refugee crises. Step 1 of this approach would provide
the permanent framework that should be executed in the event
of a migration crisis. This not only includes defining the criteria
constituting a migration crisis but also elucidating who qualifies
for international protection and the number of people to be relo-
cated, among other factors. A permanent framework that explic-
itly delineates the scope of a migration crisis will provide Mem-
ber States with uniform criteria and notice that when these cri-
teria are met, each Member State will have certain legal obliga-
tions with respect to examining asylum applications and provid-
ing refugees with certain rights. Step 2 of this approach entails
executing the emergency framework in the event of a migration
crisis. The emergency framework this Note proposes would im-
pose mandatory quotas on each Member State for the number of
applications each state is responsible for examining; however,
unlike the quota system in effect and the proposals floating
32. Council Decision 2015/1601, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 82 (EU) [hereinafter
Council Decision 2015/1601]; European Commission Press Release IP/15/5596,
Refugee Crisis: European Commission Takes Decisive Action (Sept. 9, 2015).
33. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32, at 80. The terms “solidarity”
and “fair sharing of responsibility” are key terms comprising the EU’s regional
asylum treaties and legislation in the hopes of someday forming a regional
common asylum policy. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union arts. 67, 80, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202)
[hereinafter TFEU].
34. See How Is the Migrant Crisis Dividing EU Countries?, BBCNEWS (Mar.
4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886.
35. Regulations are legislative acts that are binding upon EU Member
States. Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, https://eu-
ropa.eu/european-union/law/legal-acts_en (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
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around, the quotas advocated for in this Note will be enforceable
by the European Commission. It is crucial that the quotas are
mandatory and enforceable by the European Commission to en-
sure that each Member State is doing their share to alleviate the
deluge of migrants coming to Europe and to avoid the issue of
only a fewMember States taking in a majority of applicants. The
expanded permanent emergency framework and mandatory
quotas this Note advocates for are in accordance with interna-
tional refugee law and the regional asylum laws in force
throughout the EU. The emergency mechanism will allow more
individuals to be eligible for international protection in the event
of a migration crisis and will not sacrifice refugees’ right to asy-
lum in the event of an emergency. Additionally, such a revised
framework will allow the EU to be better prepared in handling
both the current exodus of people and future exoduses, as there
will already be procedures in place for determining how the EU
should respond and disperse asylum applicants throughout the
EU.
Part I of this Note will look at the major bodies of international
refugee law, including a historical overview of its foundations,
the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol. Part II will explore
the specific legal mechanisms that are in effect throughout the
EU, including the EU’s asylum laws and European human
rights law, which guide how Member States should treat refu-
gees generally.36 Part III will first provide an overview of the
European refugee crisis by examining its root causes and the cir-
cumstances that led to the mass exodus of people in Europe’s
most prominent refugee-producing countries. Additionally, it
will discuss Hungary and Germany’s conflicting responses to the
crisis, as these EU Member States have diverging views with
respect to accepting refugees, and the EU’s most recent agreed-
upon solution to relocate refugees through a quota system. Fi-
nally, Part IV of this Note will first critique the current quota
system and the proposal it was based upon and highlight their
inefficiencies with respect to international refugee law and EU
asylum law. It will then propose that the EU utilize a two-step
36. These include the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which all EU
Member States have either ratified or acceded to, and regional asylum legisla-
tion in effect throughout the EU. Ultimately, this Note focuses on the EU’s
heightened role in resolving migration crises because of the vast scope of bind-
ing legislation in force throughout the EU with respect to refugee protection.
See infra Parts I, II.
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approach in establishing a permanent framework for addressing
emergency migration crises. The first step of this approach,
which must be implemented immediately, would delineate the
scope of the emergency framework, including whom the emer-
gency system applies to and the criteria for triggering the emer-
gency mechanism—mainly, the conditions constituting an inter-
national migration crisis. The second part of this approach,
which would come into effect if the criteria has been met for es-
tablishing a migration crisis, will provide the procedural frame-
work to ensure Member States’ responses to migration crises are
uniform and that refugees’ right to seek asylum is protected (i.e.,
through mandatory and enforceable quotas).
I. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
International refugee law “is the body of law that regulates the
status and rights of refugees” and assists in providing lasting
solutions to refugees’ situations,37 including prolonged stateless-
ness and the uncertainty of their legal status. The crux of inter-
national refugee law is to “ensure that refugees who are outside
their countries of origin or nationality receive protection of their
basic rights,” which their own governments can no longer pro-
vide or fail to protect due to some extenuating circumstance.38
Although refugees have existed throughout history, many assert
that the current international refugee protection regime, which
includes the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, was a post-
World War II development.39 It is important to understand the
major components of the postwar global refugee protection re-
gime, as these instruments have been incorporated into the EU’s
regional refugee protection laws and European human rights
law. In order to better understand the current framework for in-
ternational refugee law, this Part will first provide a brief his-
torical overview of international refugee law. This Part will then
provide an overview of the UNHCR, which is the predominate
international agency charged with securing the welfare and pro-
tection of refugees.40 Next, this Part will examine in detail the
37. Edwards, supra note 20, at 514.
38. Id. at 513.
39. Id. at 516.
40. See generally What We Do, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which, alt-
hough nonbinding, is integral to the foundation of international
refugee law. 41 Finally, this Part will provide an overview of the
two main legal resources in which refugees’ rights are en-
shrined—the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol—and will
provide a detailed analysis of their relevant provisions.
A. Historical Overview of International Refugee Law
While refugees have existed throughout history, the interna-
tional community only put provisions in place to aid refugees be-
ginning in 1921 with the establishment of the League of Nations
and the election of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen as the first High Com-
missioner for refugees, who assisted many groups displaced by
World War I and the Russian revolution.42 The League of Na-
tions’ international refugee protection regime was limited in
scope because it defined a refugee in relation to his or her coun-
try of origin.43 Post-World War I arrangements in respect to ref-
ugee protection were also deficient because they “contained only
recommendations addressed to states parties for the treatment
of refugees” instead of clear legal requirements.44
The lack of clear legal guidelines for international refugee pro-
tection had severe consequences in the aftermath of World War
II, as an insurmountable number of individuals remained dis-
placed from Nazi persecution.45 Until 1950, “the League of Na-
tions, and thereafter the U.N., established and dismantled sev-
eral international institutes devoted to refugees in Europe,” in-
cluding the International Refugee Organization (IRO).46 The
IRO, whose chief purpose was to aid in large-scale resettlement
41. Edwards, supra note 20, at 515.
42. Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection Re-
gime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 130 (2001); DAVIDA.MARTIN ET AL., FORCED
MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 49 (2d ed. 2013).
43. Feller, supra note 42, at 129; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 50 (“This
early international regime generally defined refugees in terms of specific polit-
ical crises. Thus, international protection extended only to those who belonged
to certain national groups and who no longer enjoyed the protection of their
national government.”).
44. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 50.
45. See generally Feller, supra note 42, at 131.
46. Id. at 130.
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of refugees displaced by World War II, was established as a tem-
porary agency47 with a three-year mandate.48 At the end of the
three years, the international community proved unwilling to
continue providing financial assistance for displaced persons
and did not extend the IRO’s mandate.49 It was clear, however,
that the postwar refugee problem was far from over, as people
continued to flee Eastern Europe for resettlement in the West in
the wake of World War II and the rise of Communism respec-
tively.50 Consequently, the U.N. General Assembly, the main de-
liberative and policymaking body of the U.N.,51 decided to re-
place the IROwith the UNHCR as a subsidiary organ of the Gen-
eral Assembly.52 Furthermore, and almost simultaneously with
the establishment of the UNHCR, the international refugee pro-
tection regime was established, which includes the 1951 Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol.
B. UNHCR
The U.N. established the UNHCR after World War II to assist
with the mass influx of Europeans displaced by the war.53 The
U.N. General Assembly appeared to have underestimated the
extent of the migration flows, due to the fact it gave the program
a three-year mandate to resolve the mass displacement of people
resulting from World War II.54 A few years into its existence,
however, the UNHCRwas tasked with responding to its first ref-
ugee crisis outside of World War II—the deluge of Hungarians
fleeing Soviet forces after the Hungarian Revolution.55 Shortly
47. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 52 (“The IRO would repatriate [the ref-
ugees] that it could, seek resettlement for the rest, and then close its doors.”).
48. David Kennedy, International Refugee Protection, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 3
(1986).
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id.
51. For more information about the U.N. General Assembly, see Functions
and Powers of the General Assembly, GEN. ASSEMBLY UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
52. Feller, supra note 42, at 130.
53. History of the UNHCR, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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thereafter, it became clear the need for the UNHCR’s perma-
nency in protecting refugees, and expectations about the
agency’s temporary nature dissipated.56
The role of the UNHCR, which exists to this day, is to “provide
international protection for refugees and to seek permanent so-
lutions to their problems” by assisting destination countries in
facilitating refugees’ repatriation back to their origin countries
or assimilation within new national communities.57 In contrast
to the IRO, which provided a host of services for refugees, includ-
ing managing temporary housing and issuing passports, the
lynchpin of the UNHCR’s authority is limited to providing refu-
gees protection “normally accorded [to] a national by his sover-
eign at international law.”58 In other words, the UNHCR sup-
plants national governments that are either unwilling or unable
to protect their citizens until those governments regain the abil-
ity to do so by administering refugee protection.59
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are the main legal
instruments guiding the UNHCR’s work.60 The U.N. mandates
that the UNHCR “provide international protection to refugees
and, together with governments, . . . seek solutions” to refugees’
unique situations, including statelessness and the uncertainty
of their legal status.61 A part of the U.N. mandate includes “su-
pervising the application of international conventions” that pro-
vide for the protection of refugees.62 Furthermore, “states parties
to the Refugee Convention and/or 1967 Protocol are required to
cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions” and must
inform the UNHCR if any laws or regulations are enacted that
relate to refugees.63
56. See id. Furthermore, in 2004, the U.N. General Assembly extended the
UNHCR’s mandate to continue indefinitely “until the refugee problem is
solved.” G.A. Res. 58/153, ¶ 9 (Feb. 24, 2004).
57. Id. at 130–31.
58. Kennedy, supra note 48, at 4.
59. Id.
60. 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited June 5,
2016).
61. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 514–15.
62. See id. at 515; G.A. Res. 428(V), ¶ 8 (Dec. 14, 1950).
63. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 515; 1951 Convention, supra note 13,
art. 35.
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C. UDHR
The precepts of international refugee law are premised on hu-
man rights set forth in the UDHR.64 Similar to most of the cur-
rent refugee protection regime, the UDHR was also a response
to the mass atrocities that occurred during World War II.65 The
UDHR was formulated to express certain inalienable rights of
all people, including the right to a life of dignity and the right to
be free from torture and cruel treatment.66 The most important
provision of the UDHR relating to the treatment of refugees,
however, is Article 14, which recognizes the right of individuals
“to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”
as a human right.67 Although the UDHR is not binding on sig-
natories, it “has inspired a rich body of legally binding interna-
tional human rights treaties,” including the 1951 Convention
and it’s 1967 Protocol.68
D. The 1951 Convention
The 1951 Convention has been referred to as the “Magna Carta
of international refugee law.”69 Similar to the UDHR and the
UNHCR, the Convention emerged as a response to the turmoil
leftover from World War II.70 At the end of the war, “hundreds
of thousands of refugees wandered aimlessly across the Euro-
pean continent or squatted in makeshift camps.”71 To assuage
this problem, U.N. Member States came together and estab-
lished the 1951 Convention.72
The 1951 Convention not only defines who qualifies as a refu-
gee but “codifies the rights that refugees are to enjoy and the
correlative obligations on states to respect, protect, and fulfill
64. Edwards, supra note 20, at 31.
65. See Ed Bates, History, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 30
(Moeckli et al., 2d ed. 2014).
66. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl.
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
67. Id. art. 14.
68. The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITEDNATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-
human-rights-law/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
69. Ray Wilkinson & Mountra Skandrani, The Refugee Convention at 50, in
2 REFUGEES 2 (UNHCR ed. 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/3b5e90ea0.html.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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those rights.”73 The generally accepted purpose of the 1951 Con-
vention is that it lays out a framework whereby signatories are
to provide protection to people that the convention recognizes as
refugees.74 Furthermore, the Convention is legally binding on
signatories, which includes all EU Member States.75
One of the most significant aspects of the 1951 Convention is
that it provides the groundwork for who classifies as a “refu-
gee.”76 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention states that the designa-
tion of “refugee” applies to
any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of the country; or who, not hav-
ing a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.77
Article 1 is notable because while it defines who qualifies as a
refugee, it also limited the scope of the 1951 Convention to apply
to events occurring in Europe because of World War II.78 Conse-
quently, the 1951 Convention severely limits refugee protection
because it only applies to persons who are seeking protection as
a result of World War II. Article 1 also elucidates the grounds
excluding people from receiving international protection, includ-
ing persons who are believed to have committed war crimes and
73. Edwards, supra note 20, at 515. In respecting refugees’ rights, “states
have a negative obligation not to take any measures that result in a violation
of a given right.” Frédéric Mégret, Nature of Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANRIGHTS LAW 102 (David Moeckli et al., 2d ed. 2014). In protecting refu-
gees’ rights, “the state needs to proactively ensure that persons within its ju-
risdiction do not suffer from human rights violations at the hands of third par-
ties.” Id. Furthermore, “the state is liable for those failures that can be traced
to its shortcomings in protecting individuals from other individuals . . . or be-
cause it has failed to do something that would have prevented the violation
from happening.” Id. The obligation to fulfill “involves an obligation on states
to adopt appropriate laws that implement their international undertakings.”
Id.
74. Edwards, supra note 20, at 515.
75. States Parties, supra note 13.
76. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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crimes against humanity.79Article 3, however, enhances the pro-
visions of Article 1 and captures the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion, which obliges states to enforce the 1951 Convention in a
nondiscriminatory manner as to a person’s race, religion, or
country of origin.80
Another important provision, which some scholars have
deemed the “cardinal provision” of the 1951 Convention is “Arti-
cle 33—the ‘refugee nonrefoulement’” clause.81 Article 33 prohib-
its states from returning “a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group, or political opinion.”82 The con-
cept of nonrefoulement is so sacrosanct that the international
community has recognized it as a norm of customary interna-
tional law,83 binding on all states whether or not they are
parties to the 1951 Convention. Moreover, this provision has
been incorporated in many states’ domestic and regional asylum
legislation, including the EU’s asylum laws.84 This obligation ap-
plies equally to refugees whose claims for international protec-
tion have been determined as well as asylum seekers whose sta-
tus has not yet been determined.85 Consequently, the practical
implications of this provision are that refugees, including those
applying for refugee protection, are guaranteed the right to not
be returned to a place where their life or freedom would be
threatened on account of one of the five grounds, unless they fall
within one of the exceptions listed by Article 33.86 Thus, while
79. Id. art. 1(F). Such acts, however, may include nonviolent actions, like if
the person has reavailed him or herself of the protection of their country of
origin. Id. art. 1(C).
80. Id. art. 3.
81. Edwards, supra note 20, at 520.
82. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 33.
83. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 512; see also Christine Chinkin, Sources,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 81 (David Moeckli et al., 2d ed. 2014).
Customary international law “comprises two components: an extensive and
virtually uniform and consistent state practice and the belief that the practice
is required by law (opinio juris) rather than some other reason.” Id. at 81–82.
Furthermore, compared to treaties, “customary international law may be ac-
cepted as the law of the land without any such act of a [state’s] incorporation.”
Id. at 83.
84. See infra Part II.
85. Edwards, supra note 20, at 521.
86. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 33 (“The benefit of the [nonre-
foulement] provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there
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individuals are not guaranteed the benefits of being granted ref-
ugee status, they are guaranteed the right of nonrefoulement.
Another important provision of the 1951 Convention is the
nonpenalization clause. Article 31 “guarantee[s] nonpenaliza-
tion of asylum seekers and refugees who show ‘good cause’ for
illegal entry or stay.”87 The drafters recognized that persons flee-
ing their home countries rarely are able to satisfy the require-
ments for legal entry in the country they are fleeing to because
they are normally escaping their home country in haste and
have little time to gather their belongings and documents. Con-
sequently, the drafters observed that fleeing persecution would
fall into the “good cause” exception for illegal entry.88 The effects
of this provision on refugees are limited because, while states
are prohibited from penalizing refugees for being illegally pre-
sent, states have the power to detain refugees and apply re-
strictions on their free movement as necessary.89
Finally, the 1951 Convention also sets out the protections and
rights refugees should receive. The 1951 Convention recognizes
that refugees lawfully present in a territory should enjoy a broad
range of civil rights, including the freedoms of religion and asso-
ciation and the right to access judicial mechanisms, amongmany
others.90 The 1951 Convention also explicates certain economic,
social, and cultural rights refugees lawfully present should en-
joy, such as employment rights and certain welfare rights.91
The 1951 Convention is integral to refugee protection because
it explicates the minimum obligations that states parties must
provide to refugees and identifies refugees’ legal rights. In doing
this, the 1951 Convention elucidates a uniform and internation-
ally recognized definition of “refugee” and provides various
rights that refugees are to receive and that states are to protect,
including the right to nonrefoulement.
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country
in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a partic-
ularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”).
87. Edwards, supra note 20, at 516 (“Penalties in this sense include both
criminal and administrative penalties such as fines or [certain forms of] deten-
tion.”); 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 31.
88. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 516.
89. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 31(2).
90. Id. arts. 4–34.
91. Id.
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E. The 1967 Protocol
Although the 1951 Convention marked a step in the right di-
rection toward designing an international framework for refugee
protection, the definition of “refugee” proved to be too restrictive
as it only applied to events occurring in Europe as a result of
World War II.92 To eliminate this problem, countries that were
parties to the 1951 Convention drafted the 1967 Protocol, which
expanded the scope of who qualifies for refugee protection. The
1967 Protocol expanded the definition of “refugee” in two re-
spects.93 First, the 1967 Protocol removed the time limitation
that the 1951 Convention’s definition imposed by omitting the
phrase “[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951.”94 Furthermore, the 1967 Protocol removed the geograph-
ical limitations by stating that the term “refugee” only applied
to individuals who suffered during the prescribed time period
and as a result of “events occurring in Europe.”95 Due to this ex-
pansion, more individuals could be classified as refugees and
gain the protections and rights that refugee status provides.
II. THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR REFUGEE PROTECTION
Through the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, international
refugee law has paved the way for regional organizations, like
the EU, 96 to formulate their own unique systems of refugee pro-
tection. The EU framework for refugee protection includes EU
92. Wilkinson & Skandrani, supra note 69.
93. 1967 Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
96. In describing the EU’s makeup, the European Commission states:
At the core of the EU are the Member States—the 28 coun-
tries that belong to the Union—and their citizens. The unique
feature of the EU is that, although these are all sovereign,
independent states, they have pooled some of their “sover-
eignty” in order to gain strength and the benefits of size. Pool-
ing sovereignty means, in practice, that the Member States
delegate some of their decision-making powers to the shared
institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific
matters of joint interest can be made democratically at Euro-
pean level. The EU thus sits between the fully federal system
found in the United States and the loose, intergovernmental
cooperation system seen in the United Nations.
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asylum law, which incorporates the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, and European human rights law. These bodies of law
not only guide how Member States should assess stateless per-
sons claims for refugee protection but also elucidate rights that
each Member State is obligated to provide to persons, including
the prohibition against refoulement.
The EU has two regional treaties in force that influence the
treatment of refugees—the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU) and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights (“EU Charter”). These two regional treaties are integral
to refugee protection as they both incorporate the 1951 Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol, which make them legally binding in-
struments of EU law.97 Additionally, the EU Charter explicitly
recognizes an individual’s right to claim asylum and the protec-
tion against refoulement, which the EU is bound to respect when
executing its regional asylum laws as prescribed under the
TFEU. Besides these two regional treaties, the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System (CEAS), which is a combination of EU di-
rectives and regulations, attempts to coordinate Member States’
asylum policies as required under the TFEU in order to ensure
the rights granted under the EU Charter and international ref-
ugee law are applied uniformly throughout Member States.98
Further, protection for refugees throughout the EU stems from
European human rights law, namely through the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which prescribes the rights and pro-
tections that EU Member States99 as well as nonmembers, must
afford citizens and noncitizens, which include refugees.100 Alt-
hough an in-depth discussion of the enforcement mechanisms
EUR. UNION, HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS 3 (2014),
http://www.gr2014parliament.eu/Por-
tals/6/PDFFILES/NA0113090ENC_002.pdf.
97. TFEU art. 78(1); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
arts. 18, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter EU Charter].
98. Common European Asylum System, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm (last up-
dated June 23, 2015).
99. The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 6(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
100. See generallyMARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 985.
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are outside the scope of this section, there are judicial mecha-
nisms established by the TFEU101 and the ECHR102 to ensure
that these conventions are properly enforced against noncompli-
ant countries. This Part will explore the major facets of the EU’s
asylum laws and European human rights law and the impact
they have on individual’s right to claim asylum and seek inter-
national protection in the EU.
A. EU’s Asylum Laws
EU asylum law is unique because, once it enters into force, it
“becomes part of the legal system of each Member State.”103 In
short, the legal bases for EU asylum law are the TFEU, the EU
Charter, and the CEAS.104 The TFEU sets in motion the goal for
the EU to have uniform and harmonized asylum procedures that
also comply with international refugee law.105 Such procedures
were promulgated “with a view to offering appropriate status to
any third-country national requiring international protec-
tion.”106 The EU Charter furthers this goal of harmonization by
ensuring the right to international protection and the prohibi-
tion against refoulement in EU asylum law, making these rights
101. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has jurisdiction over
EU law. Court in Brief, EUR. COURT HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited June
12, 2016). The CJEU’s role is to “[e]nsure EU law is interpreted and applied
the same in every EU country” and to “[e]nsure countries and EU institutions
abide by EU law.” Court of Justice of the European Union, EUR. UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2016). More specifically, the CJEU has jurisdiction to “deter-
mine whether a Member State has fulfilled its obligations under European Un-
ion law.” Court of Justice Presentation, CURIA, http://curia.eu-
ropa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
102. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has jurisdiction over vi-
olations of the ECHR. Court in Brief, supra note 101.
103. Sources and Scope of European Union Law, EUR. PARL. (June 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf.
104. The Directives comprising the CEAS are not laws in the strict sense of
the word, as compared to the TFEU and EU Charter, but will be treated as
such for the purposes of this Note. Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, su-
pra note 35 (“A ‘directive’ is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU
countries must achieve. However, it is up to the individual countries to devise
their own laws on how to reach these goals.”).
105. In complying with international refugee law, this includes the principle
of nonrefoulement. Id.
106. TFEU art. 78.
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legally binding throughout all Member States.107 The CEAS tries
to further the TFEU’s goal of establishing common asylum pro-
cedures throughout the EU through various directives and reg-
ulations, which attempt to harmonize Member States’ asylum
policies by setting uniform goals and standards in assessing
claims for international protection.108
1. TFEU
The TFEU plays a key role in EU asylum law for three im-
portant reasons. First, the TFEU creates the framework for
Member States to develop a common policy on asylum.109 Sec-
ond, while the TFEU is silent on the definition of “asylum” and
“refugee,” it incorporates the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
to fill in these gaps and to serve as limits as to the minimum
obligations that Member States must provide refugees in formu-
lating a common asylum policy.110 Finally, the TFEU gives the
Council the power to adopt provisional measures when Member
States are confronted with emergency situations characterized
by a sudden deluge of migrants.111
The TFEU, along with the Treaty on European Union
(TEU),112 are the core functional treaties of the EU. The TEU
deals with the creation of the EU and its various governing bod-
ies, including the European Commission and the Council of the
EU. The TFEU articulates the EU’s spheres of competence and
establishes the areas in which the EU may act with binding au-
thority for its Member States and/or on its Member States’ be-
half.113 Occasionally, the TFEU has been expanded through
amending treaties, the last of which was the Treaty of Lisbon,
107. EU Charter, supra note 97, arts. 18–19.
108. Common European Asylum System, supra note 98.
109. TFEU art. 67.
110. Id. art. 78(1).
111. Id. art. 78(3).
112. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, June 7,
2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, however, is outside the
scope of this Note and will only be discussed in terms of the Treaty of Lisbon’s
amendments, which amended Article 6 of the TEU to make the EU Charter
legally binding throughout the EU and made the rights provided for in the
ECHR general principles of EU law. Id. art. 6.
113. See generally TFEU.
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which entered into force on December 1, 2009114 to “make the EU
more democratic, more efficient, and better able to address
global problems with one voice.”115 The Treaty of Lisbon signifi-
cantly widened the EU’s authority in regards to asylum and im-
migration questions.116 The Treaty of Lisbon switched the focus
of EU asylum law from simply the “establishment of minimum
standards” to the creation of a common system uniform in both
status and procedures.117
Throughout the amended TFEU, it is clear that the intent of
the document was to require Member States to act together in
framing a uniform policy on asylum and immigration.118 In fact,
when asylum policy is mentioned throughout the TFEU, it is ac-
companied by the words “common” and “solidarity.”119Moreover,
the TFEU actually articulates that the common system must in-
clude, inter alia, a uniform status of asylum and subsidiary pro-
tection, common procedures for granting or withdrawing uni-
form asylum or subsidiary protection status, and criteria for de-
termining which Member State is responsible for assessing asy-
lum applications.120
114. Treaty of Lisbon, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.5.html (last visited
June 12, 2016).
115. EU Treaties¸ EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/de-
cision-making/treaties_en (last updated Sept. 28, 2015); see also Lisbon Treaty,
STREITCOUNCIL.ORG, http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=the-lisbon-treaty
(last visited June 12, 2016) (The Treaty of Lisbon “introduce[d] significant in-
stitutional changes and [was] designed to streamline the decision-making pro-
cess in the EU, which now has many more member states than when the insti-
tutions were created.”).
116. MIGRATIONWATCHU.K., THE LISBON EUROPEAN REFORM TREATY IMPACT
ON ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 2 (2008), http://www.migration-
watchuk.org/pdfs/BP4_10.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the impacts of
the Treaty of Lisbon on EU asylum law, see Helen Toner, The Lisbon Treaty
and the Future of European Immigration and Asylum Law, in EUMIGRATION
LAW: LEGAL COMPLEXITIES AND POLITICALRATIONALES (2014).
117. Asylum Policy, EUR. PARLIAMENT (June 2016), http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.12.2.pdf; see also Christian Kaunert & Sarah Lé-
onard, The European Union Asylum Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon and the
Stockholm Programme: Towards Supranational Governance in a Common
Area of Protection, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q., Dec. 2012, at 15 (“[T]he Treaty of Am-
sterdam had only given the EU the competence to legislate on minimum stand-
ards with respect to several aspects of asylum.”).
118. TFEU art. 67(2).
119. Id. arts. 67(2), 80.
120. Id. art. 78(2).
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In developing this common system, the TFEU explicitly states
that the policy must comply with the “principle of nonre-
foulement,”121 but it does not explicitly define who cannot be re-
fouled. Thus, the TFEU incorporates the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol as a gap-filler by stating that any “policy must be
in accordance” with these two documents, which makes them le-
gally binding throughout the EU. Thus, it can be inferred that
one who is recognized as a “refugee” under international refugee
law would be similarly recognized under the EU’s regional laws
under the TFEU.
The TFEU is also silent about the appropriate course of action
to take in the event that the EU is confronted with a sudden
influx of refugees. The TFEU recognizes that mass migration
crises are a possibility and gives the Council the authority to
adopt provisional measures “in the event [a Member State faces
an] emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of na-
tionals of third countries” to alleviate the pressure on the Mem-
ber State in question.122 Yet, the TFEU provides no clear guid-
ance on what constitutes an appropriate response to such an
emergency. Nonetheless, this provision is still important, as it
recognizes the potential for emergencies and delineates an au-
thority who can enforce measures to address it.
2. EU Charter
When the Treaty of Lisbon amended the TFEU and TEU, it
had the effect of making the EU Charter a primary legislative
document binding throughout the EU.123 The EU Charter’s goal
is to “strengthen the protection of fundamental rights by making
those rights more visible and more explicit for citizens.”124 The
EU Charter embodies
all the rights found in the case law of the Court of Justice of
the EU; the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights; [and] other rights and principles
121. Id. art. 78(1).
122. Id. art. 78(3).
123. See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law, 27
REFUGEE SURV. Q., no. 3, 2008, at 34–36.
124. Id.
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resulting from the common constitutional traditions of EU
countries and other international instruments.125
The EU Charter represents a summation of all the rights guar-
anteed to citizens and noncitizens in the EU through EU case
law, European human rights law, and international and regional
treaties in force throughout the EU. Accordingly, when imple-
menting EU asylum laws, Member States are bound to act in
accordance with the rights granted to persons by the EU Char-
ter.126 The EU Charter is especially important for refugees, how-
ever, because of the protections provided under Articles 18 and
19.
Article 18127 of the EU Charter not only recognizes an individ-
ual’s right to asylum, but similar to the TFEU, this article incor-
porates both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in guid-
ing European states’ treatment of asylum seekers and refugees.
The incorporation of these documents is significant, as the EU
Charter does not delineate who qualifies for refugee protection,
but instead relies on the criteria set forth in the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol. Furthermore, the EU Charter also explic-
itly codifies the principle of nonrefoulement in Article 19 by pro-
hibiting states from “return[ing] a person to a situation where
he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted or runs a
real risk” of facing torture or some other form of inhumane and
degrading treatment upon return.128 In conclusion, the EUChar-
ter is important for refugee protection throughout the EU be-
cause it further codifies an individual’s right to seek asylum, re-
affirms the protection against refoulement, and makes these
rights legally enforceable throughout Member States.
125. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm (last updated Nov.
12, 2015).
126. EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN LAW
RELATING TO ASYLUM, BORDERS, AND IMMIGRATION 21 (2014) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ASYLUM LAW], http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Handbook_asylum_ENG.pdf (citing EU Charter, supra note 97, art. 51).
127. EU Charter, supra note 97, art. 18 (“The right to asylum shall be guar-
anteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in
accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union.”).
128. Id. art. 19(2); HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ASYLUM LAW, supra note 126, at
21.
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3. CEAS
The EU has been formulating the CEAS since 1999,129 begin-
ning with the Tampere Conclusions130 and its “Common Euro-
pean Asylum System” subsection, which marked the first time
that EU Member States declared their intention to develop a
common asylum policy.131 After the Tampere Conclusions, the
EU subsequently implemented several legislative measures, in-
cluding the CEAS, through regulations and directives to harmo-
nize asylum policy throughout the region.132
The Tampere Conclusions subsection on formulating a com-
mon European asylum system led to the development of the
CEAS. As a preface, and similar to the regional treaties in effect
throughout the EU, all components of the CEAS incorporate the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol in their recitals, which are
preambular text in EU legislation explaining the reasons for the
contents of the legislative act in question.133 One important com-
ponent of the CEAS is the Asylum Procedures Directive. Enacted
in 2005134 and subsequently revised in 2013, it explains the min-
imum standards required for asylum procedures (e.g., who has
access to the asylum procedures, the right to an interpreter, the
right to a lawyer, the right to appeals, among other rights that
are integral to a fair asylum determination).135 Also adopted as
a part of the CEAS was the Reception Conditions Directive. Im-
plemented in 2003136 and revised in 2013, this part of CEAS de-
tails the minimum reception conditions states must provide for
asylum applicants who are waiting for their claim to be assessed,
including access to information about their case and legal repre-
sentation, food, and housing, among other criterion, to ensure a
129. Common European Asylum System, supra note 98. This section contains
only a brief overview of the elements comprising the CEAS, as it is only neces-
sary to understand the fundamental components in assessing their impact on
EU asylum law. For a more in-depth analysis of the CEAS, see Kaunert &
Léonard, supra note 117.
130. Kaunert & Léonard, supra note 117, at 9.
131. Id.
132. Common European Asylum System, supra note 98.
133. Preamble (Citations and Recitals), EUROPA.EU, http://publications.eu-
ropa.eu/code/en/en-120200.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2015).
134. Council Directive 2005/85/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 326) (EU).
135. Council Directive 2013/32/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 180) (EU).
136. Council Directive 2003/9/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 31) (EU).
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dignified standard of living. 137 Another major component of the
CEAS is the Asylum Qualification Directive. Implemented in
2004138 and updated in 2011, this directive explicates the mini-
mum requirements a stateless person must possess in order to
qualify for refugee protection, namely persecution on account of
one of the five protected grounds.139 Another component of the
CEAS is the Dublin III Regulation. The Dublin II Regulation140
was initially implemented as part of the CEAS in 2003, but has
now been replaced by the Dublin III Regulation.141 The Dublin
III regulation establishes which EUMember State is responsible
for examining an asylum applicant’s application (i.e., in the case
of irregular arrivals,142 the Member State of first entry).143 Fi-
nally, in order to further the goals of the Dublin III Regulation,
the EURODAC Regulation, which has been operating since
2003,144 and subsequently updated in 2011, establishes an EU
137. Council Directive 2013/33/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 31) (EU); see also Kaunert
& Léonard, supra note 117, at 10.
138. Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) (EU).
139. Council Directive 2011/95/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 337) (EU).
140. Council Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) (EC); see also Kaunert &
Léonard, supra note 117, at 11 (“[T]he main principle underpinning the system
is that the State responsible for processing an application is the State respon-
sible for the asylum-seeker’s presence in the EU, that is, the State through
which an asylum-seeker has entered the EU.”).
141. Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) (EU).
142. The term “irregular” is preferred over the use of illegal when referring
to migration, as illegal migration is usually used to describe cases of people-
smuggling and trafficking of persons. Key Migration Terms, INT’L ORG. FOR
MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Irregular-migration
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (defining irregular migration as “[m]ovement that
takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving
countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular mi-
gration. From the perspective of destination countries, it is entry, stay or work
in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under
immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the ir-
regularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an interna-
tional boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil
the administrative requirements for leaving the country.”).
143. Id.; Common European Asylum System, supra note 98 (“The criteria for
establishing responsibility run, in hierarchical order, from family considera-
tions, to recent possession of [a] visa or residence permit in a Member State, to
whether the applicant has entered EU irregularly, or regularly.”).
144. Council Regulation 2725/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 316) (EC).
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asylum fingerprint database that takes the fingerprints of asy-
lum seekers and transmits their information to the EURODAC
database for all Member States to access. 145
The EU’s regional refugee protection regime is based off the
TFEU, the EU Charter, and the CEAS. The TFEU and EUChar-
ter are regional treaties in effect throughout the EU and are le-
gally binding upon all Member States. The TFEU calls upon
Member States to establish uniform and harmonized asylum
procedures that are in accordance with international refugee
law. In establishing these procedures, the provisions of EU
Charter must also be applied, which recognize an individual’s
right to claim asylum and prohibit Member States from return-
ing an individual to a place where they have a well-founded fear
of persecution. Moreover, the CEAS, as a compilation of regula-
tions and directives, tries to further the goals of the TFEU and
EU Charter by formulating harmonized asylum procedures to be
applied throughout the Member States, which take into account
the rights granted to refugees by international refugee law and
the EU Charter.
B. European Human Rights Law
EU asylum laws and policies on refugees must also be in align-
ment and effectuated within the boundaries of European human
rights law. This concept is embedded in the amended TEU,
which requires all Member States to accede to the ECHR.146 The
ECHR “gave effect to certain rights stated in the UDHR and es-
tablished an international judicial organ with jurisdiction to find
against states that do not fulfill their undertakings” as provided
by the ECHR.147 European human rights law complements the
EU’s regional asylum legislation, as European human rights law
does not explicitly recognize the right to claim asylum but
reemphasizes the prohibition against nonrefoulement.
Although the ECHR does not explicitly address the issues of
granting asylum or refugee status, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR)148 has interpreted Article 3 of the Conven-
tion to include protection against refoulement.149Article 3 states
145. Council Regulation 603/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) (EU).
146. TEU art. 6.
147. ECHR in 50 Questions, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf.
148. This court is the judicial mechanism in place to enforce the ECHR.
149. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 985.
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that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment.”150 The ECtHR has “inter-
preted [Article 3] not only to bar the infliction of torture and in-
human or degrading treatment by states parties but also to pro-
hibit returning individuals to states where they would face such
practices,”151 thereby incorporating the international principle of
nonrefoulement.152 Furthermore, the ECHR forbids states from
absconding their obligations under Article 3 in times of war or
when faced with other public emergencies.153
III. ANOVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS
The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, where over a million mi-
grants flooded the borders in 2015,154 has tested the EU’s ability
to respond to a migration crisis within the bounds of interna-
tional and regional refugee law. Civil war, generalized violence
and conflict, terrorism, and persecution by state and non-state
actors in the Middle East and Africa have forced people to flee
their homes and make the dangerous journey to Europe.155 It is
not surprising that Europe is a top destination for refugees, as
relatively speaking, Europe provides a place of stability, is de-
void of war, and accessible by land and sea. Unfortunately, this
stability is but a mere mirage, as their status and protections as
refugees remain in the hands of the EU Member State where
they arrive. The disparity of the treatment of refugees and inter-
national protection claims between Member States is odd, given
that all EU Member States are bound by the same interna-
tional156 and regional treaties pertaining to refugee protection.157
In response to and out of frustration for the lack of coordination
150. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
151. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 985.
152. Id. (“The path-breaking case for the court was Soering v. United King-
dom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), which held that Article 3 prohibited the
UK from extraditing Soering to the United States where he faced the risk of a
prolonged period on ‘death row’ in Virginia—treatment that would be inhuman
or degrading within the terms of the Convention.”).
153. ECHR, supra note 150, art. 15.
154. Irregular Migrant Arrivals, supra note 6.
155. See generally Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. BACKGROUNDERS (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/migra-
tion/europes-migration-crisis/p32874.
156. See supra Part I.
157. See supra Part II.
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among Member States, the Council of the EU implemented a
provisional measure—the quota system—to force Member
States to act cohesively in alleviating the burden of the migrant
crisis. This Part will first examine the refugees’ countries of
origin by looking at the factors present within the countries that
have caused these individuals to flee. Next, this Part will briefly
compare the conflicting nature of Member States’ responses to
the exodus, and will conclude with a discussion of the highly con-
troversial quota system.
A. Major Refugee-Producing Countries
The current number of forcibly displaced people is the most
since World War II.158 As time has progressed and the reasons
for displacement have expanded, it is important to understand
the factors underlying the new spike of refugees by examining
three of the highest refugee-producing countries: Syria, Afghan-
istan, and Eritrea. Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea have consist-
ently ranked in the top ten with respect to the origins of people
applying for refugee protection in the EU.159 The news stories
and reports, which describe these countries as politically unsta-
ble, rife with internal conflict, and abusers of human rights, de-
pict the harsh reality of individuals living in those countries.
Faced with few alternatives, refugees are often times forced to
escape these grim realities by fleeing their home country to seek
international protection from elsewhere, like the EU.
1. Syria
A violent civil war has plagued Syria since 2011 and has taken
an estimated 250,000 lives.160 The conflict started when Syrian-
158. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.
159. Data available from 2015 and 2016 reveals that Syria, Afghanistan, and
Eritrea were three of the largest refugee-producing countries during those
years. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS: WHY PEOPLE
FLEE, WHAT THE EU SHOULD DO (2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/report_pdf/eu0615_web.pdf;Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Ex-
plained in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911; Migration Flows - Europe,
INT’LORG. FORMIGRATION, http://migration.iom.int/europe/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2016).
160. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
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government-supported security forces opened fire on peaceful
prodemocracy protesters.161 The Syrian government’s hasty re-
sort to use deadly force sparked “nationwide protests demanding
Syrian President [Bashar] al-Assad”162 to resign from office.163
Shortly thereafter, anti-Assad supporters took up arms to de-
fend themselves and to expel government security forces from
local areas.164
By 2012, the fighting spiraled out of control and evolved from
just a political mêlée between supporters and opponents of Pres-
ident Assad165 into a widespread regional conflict.166 One factor
that lead to the full-scale regional conflict was that major world
powers “including Iran, Turkey, the Arab Gulf states, Russia,
and the United States,” responded to the clash by offering polit-
ical support, money, or weapons to either the Assad presidency
or the opposition fighters.167 Further igniting the chaos was the
ongoing sectarian battle between President Assad’s minority
Shia sect and the Syrian Sunni majority.168
161. Id.
162. The al-Assad family has ruled Syria since 1970. Scholars have noted
that the “A[s]sad regime’s strict political controls prevented [ethnic and politi-
cal] differences from playing an overtly divisive role in political or social life.”
CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL33487, ARMED
CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW ANDU.S. RESPONSE 7 (2015).
163. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 162.
167. Id. at 10. Additionally, BBC News states:
Iran and Russia have propped up the Alawite-led govern-
ment of President Assad and gradually increased their sup-
port, providing it with an edge that has helped it make sig-
nificant gains against the rebels. The government has also
enjoyed the support of Lebanon’s Shia Islamist Hezbollah
movement, whose fighters have provided important battle-
field support since 2013. The Sunni-dominated opposition
has, meanwhile, attracted varying degrees of support from its
main backers—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Arab
states along with the United States, United Kingdom, and
France.
Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160.
168. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160; BLANCHARDET AL., supra
note 162, at 7 (“In addition to the majority Sunni Muslims, who comprise over
70% of the population, Syria contains several religious sectarian minorities,
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The conflict continued into August 2013, when “[h]undreds of
people were killed . . . after rockets filled with the nerve agent
sarin were fired” around the nation’s capital, Damascus.169
There were allegations that only the Syrian government had the
capability to carry out these civilian attacks, which prompted a
threat of Western intervention.170 With the threat of interven-
tion looming, President Assad agreed to either completely re-
move or destroy Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal as part of a
deal brokered by the United States and Russia.171
While Syria completed its destruction of chemical weapons in
2014,172 long-term peace continues to be evasive. For instance,
reports state that the government continues to use toxic
chemicals, including chlorine, against civilians in attacks on
opponent-held territory.173 Furthermore, in 2014, the extremist
Islamist group, the Islamic State (also known as “ISIS”), capital-
ized on Syria’s continuing chaos caused by the sectarian and po-
litical conflicts and conquered huge tracks of territory through-
out the country,174which enabled the group to continuously com-
mit flagrant human rights abuses against civilians.175
With no realistic possibility of imminent peace in Syria, major
powers got involved by using airstrikes and other forceful means
to affect change in the country.176 The current situation in Syria
remains dismal, as approximately five million177 Syrians have
fled the country since the start of the conflict and at least 6.5
including three smaller Muslim sects (Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis) and sev-
eral Christian denominations. The A[s]sad family are members of the minority
Alawite sect (roughly 12% of the population), which has its roots in Shiite Is-
lam.”).
169. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Alan Rappeport, Syria’s Chemical Arsenal Fully Destroyed, U.S.
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2014, at A6.
172. Id.
173. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160.
174. Id.
175. See ISIS Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-
fast-facts/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
176. See generally BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 162.
177. This figure only includes registered Syrian refugees, which minimizes
the perception of how serious the problem is because nonregistered refugees
are not involved in the calculation. Syria Regional Refugee Response, U.N.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/re-
gional.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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million have been internally displaced within the country.178 As
the journey to Europe is extremely dangerous and costly, most
Syrians have sought sanctuary in neighboring countries, such as
Turkey and Lebanon. Over a million Syrians, however, have en-
dured the arduous trek to Europe and at least eight hundred
thousand have filed asylum applications in the EU since the con-
flict started in 2011, with over half of the total applications being
filed in 2015 and 2016 alone.179
2. Afghanistan
The situation in Afghanistan is comparable to that of Syria due
to the rampant instability and terror throughout the country.
This period of conflict, however, is a relatively recent phenome-
non, and the violence is mostly at the hands of rogue insurgent
groups, such as the Taliban.180 Further exacerbating the terror
in Afghanistan is the fact that the government has proven itself
incapable of controlling insurgent groups and at least 10 percent
of the country is out of the government’s control, meaning that
rogue groups control the fate of many Afghani civilians.181
Insurgent groups have launched frequent attacks in tradition-
ally secure provinces in Afghanistan, which has led to the dis-
placement of at least one million civilians.182 Insurgent groups
frequently target civilians to use them as hostages in exchange
for prisoners or ransom.183 Besides civilians, those most at risk
of attack are government employees, aid workers, and people af-
filiated with foreign organizations.184 These individuals are
likely victims of violence because insurgent groups view these
178. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 160.
179. Syria Regional Refugee Response, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php (last visited Oct.
16, 2016).
180. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 8.
181. US General: 10 Percent of Afghanistan Under Taliban Control, ABC
NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/us-general-10-percent-af-
ghanistan-taliban-control-42311475 (Sept. 23, 2016). http://www.to-
lonews.com/en/afghanistan/26518-.
182. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 8. As of May 2016, there were
at least 1.2 million Afghans internally displaced within Afghanistan. Afghani-
stan: Number of People Internally Displaced by Conflict Doubled to 1.2 Million
in Just Three Years, AMNESTY INT’L (May 31, 2016), https://www.am-
nesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/afghanistan-internally-displaced/.
183. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 10.
184. Id.
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individuals’ involvement with the Afghani government or for-
eign organizations as a reflection of their ideologies and beliefs,
which are in opposition to insurgent groups’ mostly antigovern-
ment and anti-Western dogmas.
Women and children also face a heightened threat of violence
committed by insurgent groups. Women and children often en-
dure the most “restrictions on freedom of movement,” as fear-
stricken families are hesitant to allow them to go outside on
their own.185 Women who defy the Taliban’s norms, such as fe-
male schoolteachers, have come under direct threat of attack.186
Furthermore, children face a heightened risk with insurgent
groups because they represent a more impressionable faction of
the Afghan population and are frequently recruited to serve as
sex slaves, combatants, suicide bombers, or assemblers of dan-
gerous weapons.187
The Afghan government is not blameless for the turmoil
throughout Afghanistan. Government officials, including civil-
ians in high-level positions and security forces, have partici-
pated in torture, rape, and extrajudicial and summary execu-
tions.188 Additionally, Afghan national security forces prioritize
the military over children’s access to education and continue to
take over schools for military uses, putting children at risk of
attacks by armed groups.189 Consequently, due to the govern-
ment’s past failures to provide protection from insurgent groups
and its continued engagement in violent acts against civilians,
it is not surprising that over 190,000 Afghanis have fled the
country and headed toward Europe to claim asylum since
2015.190
3. Eritrea
Although Eritrea is in a relative period of peace compared to
Syria and Afghanistan, the Eritrean government’s continuous
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 11.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Mil-
lion in 2015, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-
record-1-3-million-in-2015/.
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human rights abuses against its civilians have caused many Er-
itreans to make the dangerous journey to Europe.191 Eritrea is
considered one of the poorest countries in the world and its citi-
zens are forced to live under a repressive, authoritarian govern-
ment.192 The government controls all features of life, even as-
pects of independent media and independent nongovernmental
organizations,193 which has the effect of silencing the voice of the
population and keeping nongovernmental organizations out of
the country.
Eritrean law, through a practice known as “conscription,” re-
quires each citizen, whether male or female, to serve eighteen
months in the national service starting at age eighteen.194 Con-
scripts are subject to poor conditions, such as grossly inadequate
pay and harsh military discipline that frequently amounts to
torture.195 Female conscripts, in particular, are subjected to sex-
ual abuse and further ill-treatment by their commanders.196
Thus, many Eritreans try to flee conscription because they view
their military commitments as endless.197
Other violent forces driving Eritreans to flee their homes in-
clude the high risk of arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance,
and being tortured while in detention.198 Other, less violent fac-
tors include the lack of many basic freedoms, such as freedom of
expression, conscience (thought), movement, and religion.199 Ad-
ditionally, the rule of law is virtually nonexistent, as the govern-
ment possesses secret detention facilities to jail thousands of Er-
itreans, who frequently are detained without a charge against
191. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 13.
192. REGIONALMIXEDMIGRATION SECRETARIAT, GOINGWEST: CONTEMPORARY
MIXED MIGRATION TRENDS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA TO LIBYA & EUROPE 17
(2014), http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_publications/Go-
ing_West_migration_trends_Libya___Europe_final.pdf.
193. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 13; see also FREEDOMHOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015, at 20 (2015), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/de-
fault/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf (ranking Eritrea as “not free” and
one of the worst countries in the world in respect to its political rights and civil
liberties in the 2015 Freedom in the World Report).
194. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 13; see also REGIONALMIXED
MIGRATION SECRETARIAT, supra note 192, at 17.
195. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 159, at 14.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 13.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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them or given a fair trial.200 In fact, most procedural safeguards
are lacking because the country has failed to have a functioning
legislature “or any semblance of civil society organizations” since
2001.201 The lack of freedoms in many aspects of Eritreans’ lives
and consistent human rights abuses committed by the govern-
ment has led over forty-seven thousand Eritreans to make the
dangerous trek across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe in order
to apply for asylum in 2015 alone.202
B. Discordance Among the EU Member States
The EU prides itself on being a political and economic union
bound by common rules and values.203 In the wake of the recent
refugee crisis, however, the impact of the deluge has been dis-
proportionate throughout Member States, as only a few Member
States have received a majority of the applications for refugee
protection and others have simply refused to take in any refu-
gees.204 While some Member States have promoted a “welcome-
atmosphere”205 to the refugees, others have erected barriers to
prevent refugees from coming into their countries, which has
had the effect of limiting the free-flowing movement of these in-
dividuals throughout the EU.206
200. Id.
201. Eritrea, HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, https://www.hrw.org/africa/eritrea (last
visited on Feb. 16, 2016). For more information, see FREEDOM HOUSE, supra
note 144, at 20.
202. Diaspora Eritreans Protest Regime Human Rights Abuses, ALJAZEERA
(June 23, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/diaspora-eritreans-
protest-regime-human-rights-abuses-160623210503792.html.
203. EU in Brief, supra note 25.
204. See Griff Witte & Karla Adam, Britain Takes In So Few Refugees From
Syria They Would Fit on a Subway Train, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/britain-takes-in-so-few-refugees-
from-syria-they-would-fit-on-a-subway-train/2015/09/01/af427190-4b34-11e5-
80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html.
205. For example, despite the horrific terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris
on November 13, 2015, French President Francois Hollande still pledged to
allow thirty thousand refugees into France over the next two years. French
President Francois Hollande Welcomes Refugees Despite Paris Attack, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/french-president-
francois-hollande-welcomes-refugees-paris-attack/story?id=35274658.
206. See Marton Dunai & Aleksandar Vasovic, Hungary Shuts Off Migrant
Route From Croatia, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-europe-migrants-hungary-croatia-idUSKCN0SA1P620151016; Hun-
gary Says a Border Fence With Romania May Be Next, ECONOMIST (Sept. 16,
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Germany is at the forefront in shouldering the responsibility
for the mass influx of migrants arriving in Europe.207 The Ger-
man Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has promoted an open-door ref-
ugee policy in the hopes that Germany will achieve a positive
change in its society through the promotion of a receptive and
welcoming environment to those seeking international protec-
tion. 208 As a result of this open-door policy, by the end of 2015,
890,000 persons entered the country to apply for refugee protec-
tion.209 After crimes occurred, allegedly perpetrated by refugees,
opponents of the open-door policy called for Chancellor Merkel
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21664902-fight-between-two-
eastern-european-union-members-may-be-more-about-politics-
about?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e.
207. Germany is not the only Member State that has been receptive to refu-
gees, but it has employed the most prorefugee policies and has been able to
withstand the pressure from opponents and the actual influx of migrants to
keep its borders open. Sweden, for instance, was one of the most welcoming
nations for refugees. Dan Bilefsky, Sweden and Denmark Add Border Checks
to Stem Flow of Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2016, at A10. But, Sweden has
strained its resources, as it took in more asylum seekers per capita than any
other nation in Europe and had to introduce measures, such as identity checks,
to curb migrants from entering the country. Griff Witte & Anthony Faiola,
Even Europe’s Humanitarian Superpower is Turning its Back on Refugees,
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/eu-
rope/even-sweden-is-turning-its-back-on-refugees/2015/12/30/6d7e8454-a405-
11e5-8318-bd8caed8c588_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_sweden-
740pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory.
208. Justin Huggler, Refugees Will Change Germany, Merkel Says, As Gov-
ernment Releases £4.4bn To Cope with Crisis, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11849468/Refu-
gees-will-change-Germany-Merkel-says-as-government-releases-4.4bn-to-
cope-with-crisis.html.
209. Noack, supra note 10.
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to tighten Germany’s borders.210 Despite the pressure,211 Ger-
many continues to keep its borders open and still receives a bulk
of the EU’s asylum applicants, but has pleaded for other Member
States to take more responsibility in alleviating the refugee cri-
sis.212
Compared to Germany, Hungary has taken the opposite ap-
proach with respect to welcoming refugees.213 The Hungarian
Parliament, led by anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor
Orban, has taken rigid measures to close off its borders and re-
ject stateless persons, despite its location as a popular migration
route to Western Europe.214 At first, the Hungarian government
appeared to be supportive of the refugees’ plight by allowing per-
sons already in Hungary to pass through to other countries.215
Such supportive treatment, however, has disappeared in re-
gards to new arrivals that are able to reach the country’s bor-
ders.
Hungary’s drastic shift in policy is evidenced by various
measures the country implemented in its anti-immigrant cam-
paign. For instance, the “holding camp” the Hungarian govern-
ment opened for refugees in 2015 is comparable to a prison, as it
is enclosed by razor wire and patrolled by police and guard
210. Geir Moulson, Germany: Nearly 1.1 Million People Registered as Asy-
lum-Seekers in 2015; Syrians Biggest Group, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-01-06/germany-nearly-11-
million-migrants-arrived-last-year. Earlier in 2016, Chancellor Merkel’s oppo-
nents called for her to tighten Germany’s asylum laws in light of the attacks
in the city of Cologne on New Year’s Eve. Melissa Eddy, Attacks on German
Women Inflame Debate on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2016, at A1 (“Scores
of young women in Cologne had been groped and robbed on New Year’s Eve by
gangs of men described by the authorities as having ‘a North African or Arabic’
appearance.”).
211. Such resistance includes not only political pressure from opponents call-
ing on Chancellor Merkel to close the borders but also the pressure of having
to deal with an additional million people.
212. Jonathan Tirone & Arne Delfs, Merkel Says Germans Fulfill Refugee
Duty, Now Time for EU to Act, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2016), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-09-24/merkel-says-germans-fulfill-refugee-duty-
now-time-for-eu-to-act.
213. Hungary is not alone in erecting razor-wire fences to keep migrants out,
but it has proven to be the staunchest opponent of allowing refugees into its
country.
214. SeeHolly Yan et al., Refugee Crisis: Hungary Uses Tear Gas, Water Can-
nons on Migrants at Border, CNN (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/16/world/europe-migrant-crisis/.
215. Lyman & Smale, supra note 9.
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dogs.216 Furthermore, reports suggest that the Hungarian gov-
ernment used teargas and water cannons against refugees in or-
der to ensure their control.217 The country has also tried to keep
refugees out completely by building a razor-wire fence along its
southern border with Serbia and has “declared its southern bor-
der with Croatia closed to migrants.”218 Furthermore, Hungary
has also threatened to erect a fence along its border with Roma-
nia, but due to Romania’s objections,219 these plans have stalled.
Despite Hungary’s failed effort to close off its border with Roma-
nia, it has still made it nearly impossible for migrants to leave
the Balkans for Western Europe.220 This has not only prevented
refugees currently in Hungary from leaving but also has pre-
vented new refugees from entering the country who are trying
to seek the country’s protections.
C. The Quota System and EU Member States’ Responses
The EU was presented with two challenges that ultimately led
to the quota system. The first challenge was the ongoing refugee
crisis. The second challenge was coordinating a uniform solution
among EU Member States whose current refugee policies were
completely at odds with each other. To address both of these con-
cerns, the Council implemented a mandatory quota system that
was binding on all Member States.221
216. Id.
217. Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/19/hungary-new-
border-regime-threatens-asylum-seekers.
218. Dunai & Vasovic, supra note 206.
219. Hungary Says a Border Fence With Romania May Be Next, supra note
206.
220. Dunai & Vasovic, supra note 206.
221. Council Decision 2015/1523, supra note 30; Council Decision 2015/1601,
supra note 32; Migrant Crisis: EU’s Juncker Announces Refugee Quota Plan,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193568.
While the quota system is not the only measure the EU has taken to curb the
flow of migrants, it is the only Union-wide approach the EU has adopted to
internally address the crisis. Thus, other arrangements, like the EU-Turkey
Deal, a joint agreement between the EU and Turkey to end irregular migration
from Turkey to the EU, are outside the scope of this Note and will not be dis-
cussed. For information about the EU-Turkey Deal, however, see European
Commission Fact Sheet MEMO/16/93, EU-Turkey Agreement: Questions and
Answers (Mar. 19, 2016).
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The idea for refugee quotas arose from the European Agenda
on Migration, a measure adopted by the European Commis-
sion,222 which outlines various methods that are required in or-
der to respond appropriately to the refugee crisis.223 Eventually,
the European Commission morphed these outlines into a formal
legislative proposal calling for the establishment of a regional
crisis relocation mechanism and for an amendment to the Dub-
lin III regulation.224 The proposed relocation mechanism invari-
ably derogates from the procedures set out by the Dublin III Reg-
ulation, which establishes that the Member State of first entry
is responsible for examining the application for international
protection.225 The proposal states that in order to trigger the re-
location mechanism in a Member State,
the Commission must establish, on the basis of substantiated
information, in particular information gathered by EASO and
Frontex, that a Member State is confronted with a crisis situa-
tion jeopardizing the application of Regulation (EU) No
604/2013 due to extreme pressure characterised by a large and
disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals or stateless
persons, which places significant demands on its asylum sys-
tem. The crisis situation should be of such a magnitude as to
place extreme pressure even on a well prepared and function-
ing asylum system, while also taking into account the size of
the Member State concerned.226
Additionally, the proposal highlighted factors that the European
Commission should look at in determining whether a Member
State is facing extreme pressure, including the total number of
asylum applications and the number of irregular entries in the
six months preceding the adoption of the proposal, among other
222. For more information about the European Commission, see supra note
27.
223. A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015).
224. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council Establishing a Crisis Relocation Mechanism and Amending Reg-
ulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the
Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Pro-
tection Lodge in One of the Member States by a Third Country National or a
Stateless Person, COM (2015) 450 final (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter EC Pro-
posal]. For information on the Dublin III Regulation, see supra notes 141–143.
225. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
226. EC Proposal, supra note 224, at 7.
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factors.227 Furthermore, the proposal states that the relocation
mechanism will only apply to applicants whose refugee status
would be recognized by 75 percent of Member States (in other
words, applicants who the EU has determined are prima facie
refugees for the context of applying the relocation mecha-
nism).228 The proposal also prescribes a method for setting the
number of persons to be relocated, which takes into account “the
number of applicants per capita in the Member State benefiting
from relocation in the eighteen months, and in particular in the
six months” preceding the proposal’s adoption compared to the
EU’s average.229 It also sets the maximum threshold for the
amount of people to be relocated at 40 percent of the number of
asylum applications the Member State received in the six
months preceding the adoption of the proposal.230 Lastly, it pro-
vides an intricate distribution key to be utilized for determining
how many refugees each Member State will have to accept and
relocate, which takes into account a Member State’s population,
GDP, unemployment rate, and average amount of asylum appli-
cations for the preceding five years per one million inhabit-
ants.231
The quota system the Council implemented cherry picks
measures from the formal legislative proposal and adopts its
methodologies in regards to the amount of people who are to be
relocated, who the relocation affects, and how many people each
Member State is responsible for relocating.232 When the quota
system was first announced in September 2015, the Council al-
located for forty thousand individuals who were in clear need of
international protection, i.e. who qualified as refugees under the
75 percent standard, to be relocated from Italy and Greece233
227. Id. at 7–8.
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. The proposal lays out the mathematical equations for determining the
number of applicants each Member State is responsible for relocating and ac-
cepting. Id. at 10–13. For more information about the distribution of appli-
cants, see id.
232. See Council Decision 2015/1523, supra note 30; Council Decision
2015/1601, supra note 32.
233. Council Decision 2015/1523, supra note 30.
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over a two-year period.234 The Council singled out Greece and
Italy because their location along the Mediterranean Sea pro-
vided the “easiest” route for refugees to access the EU. It was
evident, however, that this amount paled in comparison to the
1,005,504 refugees that arrived in Europe by the end of 2015.235
As a result, the Council increased the total amount to 160,000 a
week later.236
Besides apportioning the total number of people that are to be
relocated, the quota system allocates the number of applicants
each EU Member State has to relocate based on the distribution
key from the proposal.237 Additionally, the quota system adopts
the 75 percent recognition rate standard as to whom the reloca-
tion mechanism will benefit—nationals who have an average re-
gional asylum recognition rate of at least 75 percent for the pre-
vious three months.238 Furthermore, the quota system provides
a financial benefit to the Member States that relocate pursuant
to the provisions of the Council’s decision.239 Member States also
have the ability, in exceptional circumstances,240 to notify the
Council that they are unable to meet the quotas for up to 30 per-
cent of the applicants allocated to that Member State and poten-
tially be released from their obligations.241
234. Id. This figure applies the proposal’s methodology and corresponds to 40
percent of the total number of people in clear need of international protection
who irregularly entered Italy and Greece in 2014.
235. Irregular Migrant Arrivals, supra note 6.
236. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32.
237. For a more detailed explanation on the distribution key for relocation,
see European Commission Fact Sheet MEMO/15/5698, Refugee Crisis – Q & A
on Emergency Relocation (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Refugee Crisis Fact
Sheet]. For a more detailed description of each Member States’ quotas, see
Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32.
238. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32, art. 3; Refugee Crisis Fact
Sheet, supra note 237 (“The 75% recognition rate threshold has two objectives:
to ensure that all applicants who are in clear and urgent need of protection can
enjoy their right of protection as soon as possible; and to prevent applicants
who are unlikely to qualify for asylum from being relocated and unduly pro-
longing their stay in the EU.”).
239. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32, art. 10 (declaring that Mem-
ber States will receive a lump sum of € 6,000 for each relocation).
240. Refugee Crisis Fact Sheet, supra note 237 (“Such exceptional circum-
stances include, in particular, a situation characterised by a sudden and mas-
sive inflow of nationals of third countries of such a magnitude as to place ex-
treme pressure even on a well prepared asylum system otherwise functioning
in line with the relevant EU law on asylum.”).
241. Id.
1378 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
The quota system, although legally binding throughout the
EU, has proven inefficient in relocating refugees. First, in the
year that the system has been in effect, approximately 5,651 out
of the permitted 160,000 applicants242 have been relocated.243
Furthermore, some Member States are frustrating the reloca-
tion efforts by refusing to accept any quotas placed upon them.
Hungary has been a staunch opponent of the refugee quotas
since they were introduced last year.244 In fact, Hungary has pro-
tested the relocation scheme on numerous occasions, including
voting against the proposal addressing whether the EU should
adopt the quota system.245 Additionally, in October 2016, the Hun-
garian government held a referendum whereby 98 percent of the
voters answered in the negative when asked whether they
wanted the EU to be able to prescribe mandatory resettlement
of refugees without the Hungarian government’s consent.246
IV. SOLUTION: ESTABLISHING A PROACTIVE FRAMEWORK TO
ADDRESS INTERNATIONALMIGRATION CRISES
The quota system that the EU ultimately adopted to address
the migrant crisis, which set out a plan to distribute asylum ap-
plicants from Italy and Greece across Member States, seemed
like a small step in the right direction. In practice, however, it
has proven to be problematic in alleviating the pressure on
Member States to respond to the crisis. For instance, someMem-
ber States have refused to accept any refugee quotas and instead
242. A mere 3 percent.
243. European Commission Press Release IP/16/3138, Delivering on Migra-
tion and Border Management: Commission Reports on Progress Made Under
the European Agenda on Migration (Sept. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Press Release
IP/16/3138].
244. Dan Nolan, Refugee Crisis: EU Divided as Hungary Attacks Migrant
Quota as “Unrealizable and Nonsense,” TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/11884665/Refu-
gee-crisis-EU-divided-as-Hungary-attacks-migrant-quota-as-unrealisable-
and-nonsense.html.
245. Michael Birnbaum, E.U. Votes to Distribute 120,000 Asylum Seekers
Across Europe, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/europe/eu-ministers-seek-common-front-on-refugee-cri-
sis/2015/09/22/34ad5a66-60a2-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html.
246. This referendum was held to be invalid under Hungarian law, however,
as voter turnout was too low. Hungary Voters Reject EU Migrant-Resettlement
Plan, but Low Turnout Invalidates Results, CNN (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/02/europe/hungary-migrant-referendum/.
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have constructed wire fences,247 which partly explains why only
three percent of the allocated number of refugees have been re-
located.248 Further, the quota system fails to have an enforce-
ment mechanism in place to ensure that each Member State is
sharing the burden in accepting refugees. With this in mind, this
Part will critique the quota system and the proposal it relies
upon, highlighting some of their major shortcomings.
This Part will then offer a two-step approach for implementing
the permanent emergency mechanism for relocating refugees in
the event of an international migration crisis. In order to con-
front the current migrant crisis and effectively address future
crises, the EU should not waste its efforts on interim solutions
that are vague, legally questionable, and distribute an insuffi-
cient number of refugees throughout Member States.249 Instead,
the EU, through acts of the European Commission and the
Council, should create and implement a permanent emergency
mechanism for addressing international migration crises. In es-
tablishing a permanent framework, the EU must first take im-
mediate steps to define the scope of the emergency framework,
including who the emergency system applies to and the criteria
for triggering the emergency mechanism (chiefly, the conditions
constituting an international migration crisis). Then, in the
event the crisis criteria are met, the EU should enforce an emer-
gency quota system that is mandatory, binding, and enforceable
upon Member States.
A. The Fault in the EU’s Reactionary Response
The quota system and the proposal it relies upon contravene
the EU’s legal obligations under international refugee law, EU
asylum law, and European human rights law, as they hamper
people’s right to seek protection in the EU by placing limits on
the type of people and the number of persons who are eligible to
benefit from the region’s protection. Additionally, the proposal is
defective because, while it is supposed to put a permanent
framework in place for the EU to handle migration crises, it does
not take into account the fact that migration crises are bound to
247. For example, smaller European countries, such as Slovakia and Hun-
gary, not only voted against the quota system but also resorted to the ECJ and
sued the Council of the EU. See Case C-643/15, Slovakia v. Council (pending
case); Case C-647/15, Hungary v. Council (pending case).
248. Press Release IP/16/3138, supra note 243.
249. See id.
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occur again in the future for reasons beyond persecution (i.e.,
environmental disasters). Further, the proposal is vague as to
what constitutes the criteria for triggering the relocation mech-
anism. For example, it relies on the standard “extreme pressure”
in determining when the relocation mechanism would be effec-
tuated, but does not define what constitutes extreme pressure.
Finally, the relocation mechanism is completely ineffective in ac-
complishing its goal of relocating refugees and distributing the
burden of this crisis among Member States because it lacks an
enforcement mechanism.
One overarching problem in both the implemented quota sys-
tem and the proposal is that they are too limited in the scope of
their application with respect to the refugees that are affected
by the relocation mechanism. To begin with, the proposal and the
resulting quota system are narrowly tailored to benefit specific
Member States being confronted by a migration emergency250 and
not the EU as a whole. This is beneficial insofar as it assists Mem-
ber States that are being unduly burdened by a high surge of refu-
gee arrivals and their applications for international protection. Un-
fortunately, however, the narrow focus on individual Member
States has limited the number of people that can be relocated,
as only 40 to 43 percent of the asylum applications filed with the
specific Member State benefiting from the relocation mechanism
in the preceding six months are considered.251 By focusing solely
on the irregular migration flows in individual Member States
versus the EU in total, the quota system and the proposal leave
uncertain the fate of a majority stateless peoples seeking inter-
national protection.252
250. See EC Proposal, supra note 224, at 9; Council Decision 2015/1523, su-
pra note 30; Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32. Consequently, Italy
and Greece were the major focus of the relocation scheme because they were
being hit the hardest with refugee arrivals. See Council Decision 2015/1601,
supra note 32.
251. EC Proposal, supra note 213, at 9; Council Decision 2015/1523, supra
note 30; Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32. The amended relocation
mechanism implemented a 43 percent threshold when it increased the number
of persons to be relocated from 40,000 to 160,000. See Council Decision
2015/1601, supra note 32.
252. The quota system only allocated for 160,000 persons to be relocated from
Italy and Greece within two years, which clearly did not alleviate the burden
on Member States, as Europe had over a million arrivals by the end of 2015.
See Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32; Irregular Migrant Arrivals, su-
pra note 6.
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Furthermore, the criteria for whom the relocation mechanism
applies is too strict, as it only applies to individuals who would
be recognized by 75 percent of Member States as refugees.253
While this standard recognizes some groups who are in dire need
of international protection, such as Syrians and Eritreans,254 it
leaves the fate of other nationalities in dire need of protection
completely in the hands of Member States. It is clear that these
measures are inconsistent with the core principles of interna-
tional and regional refugee law, as they obstruct people’s access
to international protection and severely limit the eligibility of
people qualifying for refugee status by placing an unreasonable
burden on them to meet a 75 percent recognition rate. Refugees
do not have a say in whether they are recognized as refugees by
75 percent of the EU. Rather, it is up to the individual Member
States to make determinations as to whom they grant refugee
status. Furthermore, a system that instills such a high recogni-
tion rate is irrational, as having 75 percent of Member States
agree to anything is difficult, and their discordance in this re-
gard affects refugees who are in need of international protection.
Moreover, these measures are in opposition to the law of nonre-
foulement, as an individual who would otherwise qualify for ref-
ugee status could potentially be sent back to a place where their
life or freedom would be threatened simply because 75 percent
of Member States do not agree on whether that individual is a
refugee.
Another major flaw of the proposal is that it relies on a defini-
tion of refugee that is too limited for the purposes of creating a
permanent framework that will address both the current and fu-
ture migrant crises. The proposal, as well as the binding quota
system, rely on the Asylum Qualification Directive’s definition
253. EC Proposal, supra note 224, at 8; Council Decision 2015/1601, supra
note 32, art. 3. To put this standard in perspective and to demonstrate how
unreasonable it is, a useful comparison is the U.S. legislative process, which
requires a simple majority in both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate to pass a law that affects the entire United States. The Legislative Pro-
cess, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legis-
lative_process/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
254. Afghanis, on the other hand, do not automatically qualify for relocation
under this system because 75 percent of Member States do not recognize Af-
ghanis as refugees. Refugee Crisis Fact Sheet, supra note 237.
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of “refugee status,”255which is contingent upon an applicant hav-
ing a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particu-
lar social group.256 While persecution on account of one of the
five protected grounds has been the lynchpin to international
protection in the past, the causes of mass exoduses are going to
expand in the future beyond these categories (i.e., climate
change).257 This leaves future stateless persons particularly vul-
nerable because the proposal and quota system limit the
grounds for qualifying for refugee protection in the EU to those
five categories.
Consequently, the proposal and the quota system in effect
seem to be in opposition with the tenets of international refugee
law and the EU’s regional asylum laws. International refugee
law, through the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, defines
who qualifies as a refugee and outlines the minimum rights
states parties must offer to those who qualify as refugees, includ-
ing the right of nonrefoulement.258 The EU’s asylum law and Eu-
ropean human rights law also recognize the right of nonre-
foulement,259 and EU asylum law goes further in incorporating
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol through asylum legisla-
tion to make both treaties of international refugee law legally
binding throughout the EU.260 Thus, with these laws in force, it
is unclear how the EU could have implemented a quota system
based on a proposal whose provisions are anathema to the whole
scheme of international protection.
The proposal is also deficient because it lacks defined criteria
for what triggers the relocation mechanism, consequently mak-
ing the implementation of permanent emergency quotas nearly
impossible. According to the proposal, the relocation mechanism
255. EC Proposal, supra note 224; Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note
32, art. 2(c).
256. Council Directive 2011/95/EU, supra note 139, art. 2(d), (e).
257. A full-blown discussion about the impacts of climate change and the con-
troversies associated with climate change are outside the scope of this Note.
Relevant here, however, is the fact that “climate refugees” have already been
recognized as a group that is deserving of international protection. See Ken-
neth R. Weiss, The Making of a Climate Refugee, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 28,
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/the-making-of-a-climate-refugee-
kiribati-tarawa-teitiota/.
258. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 33.
259. Id.; ECHR, supra note 150, art. 3.
260. See supra Part II.
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will come into effect when a Member State faces “extreme pres-
sure characterised by a large and disproportionate inflow of
third-country nationals,” which places a significant burden on
its asylum system.261 This definition is too vague, as the terms
“extreme pressure” and “large and disproportionate” can be in-
terpreted differently amongst the Member States. Furthermore,
while the proposal tries to limit the European Commission’s in-
terpretation by prescribing certain criteria it must take into ac-
count in determining whether an emergency situation exists in
a Member State,262 it is still at the European Commission’s dis-
cretion to interpret the criteria as broadly or narrowly as the
Commission pleases.
Finally, the relocation mechanism has proven itself ineffective
in transferring refugees because it lacks an enforcement mecha-
nism. There are no consequences in place if a Member State de-
cides to ignore the quotas and instead erect walls to keep people
out, as evidenced by actions of the Hungarian government.263
The European Commission recognized this deficiency and for-
mulated a new set of proposals,264 which among other things, re-
quires Member States to make a “solidarity contribution” of
250,000 euros per applicant that the Member State is assigned
but neglects to accept.265 It is unclear whether this penalty is
enough of a deterrent to encourage Member States to accept the
burden in taking in refugees. The fact that it is called a “solidar-
ity contribution” versus a more punitive classification, such as a
sanction, however, seems to downplay the disciplinary effect this
provision will have on Member States.
261. EC Proposal, supra note 224, at 7.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text.
264. The European Commission’s 2016 proposal is similar in content to the
2015 Proposal, but no legally binding resolution has come about from it. Thus,
the 2016 proposal will only be discussed here when its terms address a defi-
ciency in the original proposal, from which the binding quota system was es-
tablished. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Mem-
ber State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protec-
tion Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a
Stateless Person (Recast), COM (2016) 270 final (May 4, 2016) [2016 Proposal].
265. Id.
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B. Solution Part I: Defining the Scope of the Emergency
Framework
In order to respond to the most recent migration crisis and fu-
ture crises within the bounds of international refugee law, EU
asylum law, and European human rights law, the EU should im-
mediately implement a permanent emergency framework that
addresses the shortcomings of the original proposal and reloca-
tion mechanism. Defining the emergency quota system’s scope is
time sensitive because, in the event of a migration crisis, it is
critical that Member States already have a method in place for
responding, instead of scrambling to figure out how to act. In
defining the scope of an emergency, this framework should 1)
establish definitive criteria that, if met, would trigger the emer-
gency quotas; 2) incorporate a more expansive definition of the
term refugee so the solution not only applies to the current crisis
but also to future migration crises that are caused by factors be-
yond persecution; 3) decrease the 75 percent recognition rate to
expand the pool of applicants who would qualify for interna-
tional protection; and 4) increase the 40 percent threshold for
the amount of applicants to be relocated so more asylum seekers
can be transferred.
1. Establishing Objective and Enhanced Crisis Criteria
The emergency framework should contain specific and objec-
tive criteria, chiefly in respect to what constitutes a migration
crisis, so that all Member States are aware of the factors that
will trigger their legal obligations under the relocation scheme.
The standards the EU proposed and adopted in the quota system
currently in force, including “extreme pressure,” for triggering a
relocation mechanism, are too vague and leave too much up for
interpretation, most importantly when the relocation mecha-
nism would come into effect. Furthermore, the conditions neces-
sary to establish a migration crisis should not be narrowly tai-
lored to a specific Member State but instead should apply to the
EU generally because irregular migration patterns are a re-
gional issue that Member States should collectively aim to solve.
Although it is difficult to define what constitutes a migration
crisis, it is a necessary factor for implementing a durable, per-
manent emergency framework. Consequently, it is crucial to
adopt a bright-line number for the amount of irregular arrivals
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and asylum applications in the EU that will trigger the emer-
gency relocation mechanism. A number is the clearest indicator
that a crisis is occurring and is easy to obtain, as the EU has
agencies in place, such as Eurostat266 and Frontex,267which keep
track of the number of asylum applications made in the EU, the
number of irregular arrivals, among other types of information
pertinent to migration in the EU. The defining number has to be
a reasonable number in light of the fact that this framework is
only for migration emergencies. Thus, the number cannot be so
low that it falsely triggers the emergency mechanism with every
spike in arrivals and asylum applications. On the opposite end,
however, the number cannot be so high as to prevent the emer-
gency relocation mechanism from ever being used. Based on
these considerations, and looking at the number of irregular ar-
rivals and asylum applications that triggered the current quota
system to be implemented in Italy and Greece,268 a reasonable
number of refugees to trigger the crisis threshold would be
150,000 irregular arrivals in Europe. The 150,000 number would
not be limited to the borders of one particular Member State,
rather it represents the aggregate of irregular arrivals in all
Member States. Once that quota has been met, the crisis criteria
would come into effect to distribute the number of asylum appli-
cations amongst the Member States.
Additionally, the permanent relocation mechanism should in-
clude language that affects an EU-wide response even when one
Member State is confronted by a migration crisis. The EU is a
266. Eurostat is the “statistical office of the European Union . . . . [whose]
mission is to provide high quality statistics for Europe.” See Overview,
EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview (last visited Oct. 9,
2016).
267. Frontex is the agency charged with the EU’s border management. Mis-
sion and Tasks, FRONTEX, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-
tasks/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
268. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32 (“According to data of the Eu-
ropean Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Exter-
nal Borders (Frontex), the central and eastern Mediterranean routes were the
main areas for irregular border crossing into the Union in the first 8 months
of 2015. Since the beginning of 2015, . . . [a] strong increase was also witnessed
by Greece in 2015, with more than 211,000 irregular migrants reaching the
country (including approximately 28,000 irregular migrants who have been
registered by local authorities, but have yet to be confirmed in Frontex data).
During May and June 2015, 53,624 irregular border crossings were detected
by Frontex and during July and August 137,000, an increase of 250%.”).
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collective political and economic union269 and when one Member
State is suffering, it inherently affects all EU Member States.270
By changing the language to reflect the EU as a region versus a
specific Member State, it reinforces the idea of collective action
and uniformity in addressing the needs of asylum seekers. Ad-
ditionally, this language will hopefully help each Member State
realize that it is within their best interest to not stall the reloca-
tion process, as each Member State’s actions (or inactions) have
a direct impact on the efficacy of the EU.271
Setting objective criteria for determining when amigration cri-
sis is occurring and making it applicable to the whole EU versus
individual Member States has various benefits. To begin with,
each Member State will be on notice about when their legal ob-
ligations to accept and relocate refugees will come into effect,
which helps them to better prepare when they receive their allo-
cation of asylum seekers. Furthermore, by switching the focus
from an individual Member State facing a migration emergency
to the EU as a whole, it reinforces that core idea that the EU is
a collective regional organization where each Member State’s ac-
tions have an impact on the functioning of the EU.
2. Expansive Definition of Refugee
A permanent emergency framework must be proactive and for-
ward-looking in delineating the qualifications for refugee status.
Circumstances causing mass displacement have progressed sig-
nificantly since the adoption of the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, and persecution on account of one of the five protected
grounds (race, religion, membership in a particular social group,
nationality, and political opinion)272 is not the sole factor causing
persons to seek international protection. Consequently, the per-
269. EU in Brief, supra note 25.
270. Take for example, the Eurozone debt crisis, where several Eurozone
Member States, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus, were unable to
repay their government debts or bail out overindebted banks without the as-
sistance of third parties, such as other EU Member States and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, among others. See generally Christopher Alessi &
James McBridge, The Eurozone in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
BACKGROUNDERS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/eu/eurozone-crisis/p22055.
271. The new permanent emergency framework should read: “When the EU is
faced with an emergency migration situation, as defined by the criteria . . . .”
272. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
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manent framework should consider other causes of mass dis-
placement in establishing who qualifies for international protec-
tion.
For a more robust definition of “refugee,” the EU should em-
ploy the definition utilized by the Organization of African
Unity’s (OAU) Refugee Convention, the regional legal instru-
ment governing refugee protection in Africa,273 which provides a
very comprehensive definition of “refugee.” This definition not
only applies to individuals who have a well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of one of the five protected grounds but also
to
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or national-
ity, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order
to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality.274
As compared to the definition of “refugee” in the 1951 Conven-
tion and 1967 Protocol,275 the OAU definition of “refugee” focuses
on the objective circumstances that compel individuals to flee
and includes situations not based on deliberate state action.276
Moreover, the OAU’s definition is flexible and applicable to mod-
ern day factors causing displacement. It is crucial that the EU
utilize a similar expanded definition in classifying who qualifies
as a refugee under the emergency quotas since the framework
for the emergency mechanism is being implemented far in ad-
vance of the crisis and the EU will not know the factors causing
the influx until it happens. This expanded definition will also
complement persecution as a ground for refugee status, as it will
expand the eligibility of people who are able to seek interna-
tional protection under the emergency quotas.
273. Marina Sharpe, African Union Refugee Definition, RTS. IN EXILE
PROGRAMME, http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/african-union-refu-
gee-definition (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
274. Org. of African Unity [OAU] Convention Governing Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1.
275. See supra Part I.
276. Alternative Standards Specific to Refugees – The Regional Level, FORCED
MIGRATION ONLINE, http://forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-
guides/international-law-and-legal-instruments/alternative-standards-spe-
cific-to-refugees-the (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
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3. Decreasing the 75 Percent Recognition Rate
To limit the quota system’s application, the EU adopted a 75
percent threshold, which meant that an applicant would have to
be recognized as a refugee by three fourths of Member States to
qualify for the relocation scheme.277 This threshold is too high
and arbitrary, as it only applies to a few nationalities, namely
Syrians and Eritreans because they are recognized as refugees by
three quarters of Member States, and leaves the rest of the people
seeking international protection who do not meet this high burden
in a state of flux. Thus, to address this issue, the EU can either
reduce the threshold to a less burdensome number (i.e., at least to
55 percent,278 which still qualifies as a majority of Member States)
or remove the recognition rate completely. As the EUwould be fac-
ing a crisis situation when the quotas come into effect, it is under-
standable why they would not want to remove the recognition
threshold in total because, in such a case, applicants who are un-
likely to qualify for asylum are incentivized to prolong their stay in
the EU. Consequently, the best option for the emergency frame-
work is to reduce the threshold amount to at least 55 percent. This
option is a compromise but still requires a majority of the EU to
recognize an applicant’s claim for refugee status. On the other
hand, however, the lower threshold allows more people to benefit
from the emergency relocation mechanism and provides greater
international protection in a timely manner.
Additionally, the 55 percent threshold seems to align more
with international refugee law and the EU’s asylum laws, as it
allows more individuals to have access to asylum procedures.
Moreover, the lower threshold promotes efficiency in a crisis sit-
uation as it weeds out applicants who are highly unlikely to
qualify for asylum without completely sacrificing human rights,
due to the fact that more nationalities would eligible for the ben-
efits of the relocation mechanism.
4. Increasing the Threshold Number of Applicants to be
Relocated
To further limit the quota system’s application, the EU set the
number of people to be considered for relocation at 40 percent of
277. Council Decision 2015/1601, supra note 32, art. 3.
278. A 55 percent recognition rate establishes a simple majority, as fifteen
out of twenty-eight Member States must recognize an individual as a refugee
in order to qualify under the framework this Note proposes.
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the number of asylum applications lodged with the Member
State in the six months preceding the adoption of the relocation
mechanism.279 This limitation clearly led to disproportionate re-
sults, as only 160,000 out of a million refugees that arrived in
Europe in 2015280 were allocated for the relocation mechanism
by applying the 40 percent criteria to the number of asylum ap-
plications lodged in Greece and Italy in the preceding six
months.281 While it is difficult to determine a precise number of
applicants to be relocated before the crises occur under the new
framework, it is clear that the number of applicants to be trans-
ferred should reflect more than 3 percent of the actual arrivals
coming to Europe. With this in mind, the permanent framework
should set a limit of relocating at least 75 percent of the asylum
applications lodged with the EU in total in the six months pre-
ceding the execution of the emergency framework—i.e., when
the 150,000 figure is met, the relocation mechanism will come
into force and distribute 75 percent of the asylum applicants
lodged with the EU among the Member States. The 150,000 fig-
ure essentially sets a floor for the number of refugees that are
needed to trigger the mechanism, however, thereafter the mech-
anism will be flexible in that, no matter how many refugees ar-
rive, 75 percent of them will be redistributed.
It is important that the permanent emergency framework al-
locates a reasonable number of persons to be relocated with re-
spect to the number of asylum applications received by the EU.
It is superfluous to set rigid numbers based on the past number
of asylum applications and not revisit the totals every few
months to ensure the number of people being relocated matches
up with actual number of people entering Europe. While the
number of individuals to be relocated is a bright-line rule in pro-
portion to the number of applications received, the number can
be increased based on quarterly reviews—i.e., if in three months
after the relocation scheme comes into effect 300,000 more ap-
plications are received, 75 percent of those applications will be
distributed among Member States. Consequently, the proposed
relocation mechanism will remain flexible as the crisis continues
and will reflect the true number of individuals arriving in Eu-
rope.
279. EC Proposal, supra note 224.
280. Irregular Migrant Arrivals, supra note 6.
281. See generally EC Proposal, supra note 224; Council Decision 2015/1601,
supra note 32.
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C. Solution Part II: Mandatory Emergency Refugee Quotas
and Enforcement
The second part of the permanent framework involves execut-
ing and enforcing the emergency relocation mechanism when
the crisis criteria are met. When it is established that a migra-
tion emergency is occurring, the mandatory quotas should come
into effect. The quotas would be mandatory in the strict sense of
the word and would not allow a Member State to avoid its re-
sponsibilities by making financial contributions. In determining
how many refugees an individual Member State is responsible
for relocating, the methodologies from the original proposal
should be utilized, which take into account each Member State’s
population, gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate,
and average number of asylum applications for the preceding
five years per one million inhabitants.282 The original proposal
places greater emphasis on GDP and population,283which should
remain heavily weighted in the new permanent emergency
framework this Note proposes because they are clear objective
criteria establishing how many people a Member State is physi-
cally and economically able to receive.
Once the numbers are established, the European Commission
would be charged with executing the quotas and monitoring to
ensure that each Member State is sharing the burden in relocat-
ing refugees. If a state is noncompliant in accepting refugees,
various enforcement mechanisms would be available, including
formal infringement proceedings, referral of the matter to the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), or sanctions.
Clearly, these enforcement mechanisms are severe, and the first
step in addressing a noncompliant Member State would be to
handle the matter informally through an early settlement mech-
anism whereby the European Commission notifies the Member
State of the violation and the Member State attempts to address
the violation.284 If the Member State refuses to rectify their be-
havior, in this case not accepting refugees, the Commission
282. EC Proposal, supra note 224, at 10–13.
283. Id. In fact, the 2016 proposal solely relies on GDP and population in
determining how many refugees a Member State is responsible for accepting
and relocating. 2016 Proposal, supra note 264.
284. See Infringement Procedure, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/info/infringement-procedure_en#formal-procedure (last visited Oct.
10, 2016).
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would have the authority to launch a formal infringement pro-
ceeding.285
In formal infringement proceedings, the European Commis-
sion sends a letter to the noncompliant Member State requesting
further information about the infraction of EU law, to which the
Member State usually has two months to respond.286 If the Eu-
ropean Commission ultimately finds that the Member State is
failing to fulfill its obligations under EU law, it can send an opin-
ion requesting the Member State in question to comply with the
law.287 If the Member State continues to be noncompliant, the
European Commission has the power to refer the matter to the
CJEU, which will issue a binding ruling.288 If the CJEU finds
that a Member State has violated EU law, the national authori-
ties of that Member State must take action to comply with the
CJEU’s judgment.289 If, despite the CJEU’s decision, a Member
State continues to breach EU law, the European Commission
can refer the case back to the CJEU a second time, and the CJEU
would then have the power to impose sanctions against the
breaching Member State.290
It is crucial that the permanent emergency framework contain
a stringent enforcement mechanism in order to deter Member
States from breaching their legal obligations in accepting refu-
gee quotas. Member States need to be held accountable for their
actions, as there would be very little incentive for Member States
to follow the laws if they would not be penalized for their defi-
ance. It is especially important to set up an enforcement mecha-
nism because some central authoritative body needs to be re-
sponsible for administering the quotas and making sure each
Member State is acting for the collective benefit of the EU by
doing their part to alleviate the crisis.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.; see also Financial Sanctions, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/financial-sanc-
tions/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
289. Infringement Procedure, supra note 284.
290. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The EU, as a microcosm of the global community, has demon-
strated the deficiencies in responding to the current refugee cri-
sis with reactionary and temporary solutions. These shortfalls
demonstrate the need for vast reform in how the EU deals with
international protection during migration emergencies. It is nec-
essary to make these changes now, as migration crises will con-
tinue to occur for varying reasons beyond the five protected
grounds of persecution. Thus, the EU needs to have permanent
measures in place for dealing with sudden influxes of migrants.
The EU should implement a permanent solution, which would
take effect in the event Member States are being confronted by
a migration crisis. The first part of this solution should be im-
plemented immediately, as it establishes bright-line criteria for
determining when a migration crisis is occurring and who qual-
ifies for refugee protection, among other criteria. This will put
Member States on notice that they will have certain legal obli-
gations to undertake when these criteria are met. The second
part of this solution will enter into force in the event the crisis
criteria are met and will establish each Member States’ legal ob-
ligations in alleviating the burden, i.e., through mandatory quo-
tas, which are enforceable by the European Commission. This
approach will humanely address refugees’ rights and livelihoods
since it will provide clear and enforceable guidelines for the EU
on refugee protection during mass migration crises and the roles
of each Member State in alleviating the crisis at hand.
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